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Methodological Precision in Qualitative Research:
Slavish Adherence or “Following the Yellow Brick Road?”
John R. Cutcliffe
University of Maine, Orono, Maine, USA

Henry G. Harder
University of Northern British Columbia, Canada
Qualitative research has withstood many challenges on its way to
becoming a credible research paradigm, though it remains the case that
the paradigm contains ongoing methodological debates. One such debate
is, for want of a better expression, the necessity for methodological
precision (fundamentalism or purity). While it is accurate that research
methodologies are somewhat fluid in that they are refined over time, it is
equally correct that some researchers fall into a trap in claiming such
fluidity is the reason for their imprecise use of a research methodology.
Given that scientific knowledge is inextricably linked to the practice of
method (at the very least for those who subscribe to positivist, postpositivist and to some extent modernist views) and that method is prefaced
and underpinned by methodology, if methodological slippage has
occurred and there is resultant incongruity between methodology and
method, then an argument can be made that the study is not a scientific
study and consequently cannot make the claim that it has produced
scientific knowledge. Even allowing for some movement from the abstract,
idealization of a given methodology into the “real world” application of
the method, it is essential to note that variation in or movement away from
a method’s underpinning methodology and epistemological stances can
and does occur in well-designed studies; but if such movement occurs
purposefully and/or has an robust rationale, grounded in the method’s
original methodology. Keywords:
Qualitative, Research,
Method,
Methodology, Precision, Ontology, Epistemology
Scientific literature, quite rightly, allows if not actually encourages room for
methodological debate and the methodological literature emanating out of the academic
disciplines of the authors is no different. Some journals have sections dedicated to
methodological papers and methodological debates/advances. Research method and
methodology are themselves phenomena that are subject to epistemological questions and
issues; they have a duplicitous nature being both firmly grounded in original (or/and
traditional) well documented philosophical positions, yet simultaneously are subject to
evolution, adaptation and development (see for example Cutcliffe, 2005; Greene, 2007;
Johnson, Long, & White, 2002).
However, it can be argued that purported methodological developments can
actually weaken the potency of the method(ology), especially if changes in the design are
incongruent with the method’s underpinning philosophy, epistemological stances and
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methodological tenets. Some authors have written to defend if not actually advance the
position that adherence to established (published) methodological procedures is contraindicated. Johnson et al. (2002) declare, for example, that,
whilst rigid adherence to particular published procedures might be
possible, we argue that in many cases this is neither necessary nor more
likely to increase the validity of the research outcome. (p. 243)
Mindful of these documented positions, the authors of this current paper wish to attempt
to advance the associated debate for the following reasons: Firstly, few scholars would
disagree with the view that they want to conduct research that is regarded as high quality
and ethical, or research that produces findings that have a high degree of accuracy and/or
utility. Similarly, the authors of this paper doubt that there are many credible scholars
who wish to advance the legitimacy, credibility and value of their study on the basis that
it was poorly designed. While the position highlighted in the previous sentence might be
regarded as axiomatic, unfortunately the academic literature contains too many examples
of research reports that would be difficult to describe as meeting the criteria outlined in
the previous sentence. This view is shared by numerous authors. Hammerley’s (2003)
fine scholarly work, for example, makes the case that within the qualitative paradigm,
there are serious methodological issues that still need addressing. Similarly, Carter and
Little (2007) remark that qualitative research reporting is frequently insufficient in the
areas of epistemology, methodology and method. As a result, these authors feel that such
papers indicate a lack of engagement with and comprehension of these important
concepts. Secondly, the authors wish to contribute to the debate regarding, for want of a
better expression, the search for methodological precision and in so doing, explore the
possible deleterious effects of publishing research reports that lack methodological
precision.
To this end the authors consider: What is this phenomenon called “scientific
research method(s)”and how does it pertain to qualitative research? When the literature
refers to research method and methodology, is this a reference to the same thing(s)? Next,
the authors consider two broad positions on this issue and these can be categorized
(loosely) as those who champion the idea of methodological precision, sometimes
referred to as methodological purists or fundamentalists (Johnson et al., 2002; Carter &
Little, 2007) and those who are comfortable with imprecision, “method slurring” and socalled “methodological pluralism” (Morse, 1991, p. 15; Baker, Wuest, & Stern, 1992;
Johnson et al., 2002). We then explore what methodological precision is supposed to do
and why it is necessary. Following this we give thought to what happens to the credibility
of findings from studies where methodological slippage has occurred.
The So-Called Scientific Method(s) as it Pertains to Qualitative Research
At the outset it should be acknowledged that the nature of scientific method is a
matter of unresolved debate (see for example, Feyeraband, 1978; Kuhn, 1962).
Epistemologists and philosophers of science have attempted to examine the logic of the
so-called scientific method, and most importantly (in the view of the authors of this
paper) have also tried to identify what (if anything) separates science (and the knowledge
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produced by science) from non-science (and the knowledge produced by these nonscientific methods) (see for example, Popper, 1959). Drawing on only a sample of the
extant literature from the first author’s academic discipline, numerous authors (Carper,
1978; Cronin & Rawlings-Anderson, 2003; Estabrooks et al., 2005; Robinson &
Vaughan, 1992) have made important contributions to this debate. Interestingly, each
clearly identify and argue for recognizing the different forms of knowledge used in
nursing. Carper (1978) for example, offered a taxonomy of nursing knowledge,
suggesting that in any given nursing situation there are elements of knowledge being
utilized from each of her four categories of empirics, ethics, aesthetics and personal
knowledge with Carper’s Empirical category referring to knowledge gained through
observation and scientific testing of theories. As a result, there is little (if any)
documented dispute within the extant nursing literature that nurses access and use
different types or forms of knowledge and further that there is a broad consensus that
scientific/empirical knowledge is distinct from other forms of knowledge.
The scientific method, which appears to have crystalized during the 17th and 18th
centuries (see Francis Bacon, 1620 and/or Rene Descarte’s 1637 seminal contributions),
is synonymous with ‘natural sciences’ and quantitative research methods and those who
hold positivist, post-positivist and to some extent modernist views. Irrespective of one’s
‘methodological bent’ or ideological stance, it remains important to understand the
background and evolution of science and its inextricable link with method. One cannot
understand the epistemological product and function of science without simultaneously
acknowledging how science is tied to method (our emphasis). In order to ‘qualify’ as
science, or be termed scientific, according to Sir Issac Newton, (1999) a method of
inquiry must be based on gathering empirical and measurable evidence subject to specific
principles of reasoning. For Newton, there are rules for the study of natural phenomena
and these distinguishable features separate and differentiate scientific inquiry from other
methods of obtaining knowledge. For example, scientific method should include a
measurable/testable hypothesis (or testable propositions within the hypothesis), have
steps to test the hypothesis that must be repeatable, be as objective as possible, and the
research method/design should be comprehensively documented so as to allow
replication/reproducible findings.
Given that a single observation might be a random event (and thus is deemed to
have little long-term predictive value), confirmation (or refutation – see Popper, 1963) of
the original observation is necessary. Accordingly, more observations of the phenomenon
of interest are sought. Staying with the example of gravity, consider for example,
Eddington’s reporting of one of the most important scientific discoveries of the 20th
century, namely confirmation of Einstein’s Theory of General Relativity (Dyson
Eddington, & Davidson, 1920). Though Eddington’s observations provided unequivocal
support for Einstein’s theory, confirmation of these findings was still required (by a team
from the Lick Observatory; Kennefick, 2009), and many others more latterly in order to
confirm the findings and move them into the realm of established scientific fact.
If the data and measurements support the proposition(s) and if our predictions
turned out to be accurate, then we have an increased degree of empirical confidence in
the accuracy of our hypothesis. Once subjected to multiple confirmations, if these
repeated studies also confirm our proposition(s), then the hypothesis may well be
promoted to the status of scientific theory (e.g., Einstein’s theory of relativity). On the
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other hand, if the hypothesis is not supported by the findings then our theory was
erroneous and/or needs to be reconstructed, and/or our propositions were incorrect and
we need to refine them, and/or our research design was flawed.
Hammersley (2003) reminds us that, during the second half of the 20th century,
there was an increasing recognition of the well-documented failures of quantitative
research and that the corresponding rise in influence of qualitative research resulted (at
least in part) as a consequence of this enhanced recognition. Qualitative research was
regarded as separate from quantitative research and with that, separate from the (socalled) scientific method. While espousing distinctiveness and difference from the
scientific method, qualitative researchers did not completely abandon or reject the idea
(and associated practices) of research underpinned by method; method was still present
and necessary – albeit a method(s) different from the so-called scientific method. For
example, qualitative researchers still acquired and analyzed data (though commonly
linguistic rather than numerical in origin) and had various strategies, techniques and
procedures for collecting/analyzing this data. Qualitative research still involved samples
and sampling (and therefore had to have associated procedures on how and who to
sample). Qualitative research might not have needed or used hypotheses but it still
included research questions, even if these were as nebulous as Glaser’s (1978) general
wonderment. Qualitative research accounts or reports still included description of the
research design, the steps, stages or procedures that the researcher followed in order to
undertake the study. Accordingly, this brief review of the relationship between science
and method serves to illustrate a number of important points:
1) That scientific knowledge is produced as a result of the practice of the
method – even for many qualitative researchers and moreover for those
who subscribe to positivist, post-positivist and to some extent modernist
views;
2) That research method has a specific form(s);
3) And that scientific research methods, whichever paradigm they are
associated with, still have labels for concepts and practices and unique
analytical procedures that differentiate scientific research method(s) as
different from other forms of knowledge generation (e.g., logical,
semantic, systemic or aesthetic.)
Before these positions are advanced any further, it should be noted and acknowledged
that the development and importance/relevance of method is inseparable from the history
(and/or the emergence) of science itself (our emphasis). Crucial issues about what we
know (and what we don’t) go hand-in-hand with epistemological and methodological
questions concerned with how are we going to find out. As a result, the overarching issue
and question of methodological precision (or purity/fundamentalism) is inextricably
linked to a parsimonious yet immensely important question: What is science and
inversely what is not (see for example Popper, 1963).
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When is a Door Not a Door? Methodological Fundamentalism and Precision
Though perhaps esoteric musings for some and irrelevant omphaloskepsis (i.e.,
navel-gazing as a self-absorbed and/or egotistical pursuit) for others, for the authors of
this paper the question of what can legitimately be classified as science (and with that
empirical knowledge) goes to the heart of the matter of methodological precision. In
addition, as we have pointed out earlier, in order for a research study to produce scientific
knowledge, the study needs to include (at least implicitly) a methodology and/or
articulated research method, given that scientific knowledge is inextricably linked to the
practice of method, especially for those who hold positivist, post-positivist and to some
extent modernist views (Rolfe, 2006).
Research methodologies or any of the synonyms used to depict the distinct
strategies for approaching qualitative research (see for example A Set of Reconstructed
Logics, Carter & Little, 2007; Strategies of Inquiry, Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Traditions
of Inquiry, Cresswell, 1998) inevitably depict the distinct strategies for approaching
research and justify the particular methods used in that methodology. Accordingly,
methodologies are not a free for all where, metaphorically speaking, anything goes.
Several authors who have made seminal contributions to the qualitative research
methodological literature remind us that methodology and method do matter (our
emphasis). Morse and Field (1995) declare that,
Each of the qualitative methods answers different questions; the methods
are distinct (emphasis added) and the results provide a different
perspective on the phenomenon. (p. 36)
Similarly, Guba and Lincoln (1994) affirm this view stating,
The methodological question: how can the inquirer (would-be-knower) go
about finding out whatever he or she believes can be known? ....That is,
not just any (original emphasis) methodology is appropriate. (p. 108)
While it appears to be the case that certain methodologies are more/less prescriptive than
others about the resultant methods and actions that flow from methodology, to a greater
or lesser extent each contains some level of prescription. As a result, it can be argued that
an awareness of and adherence to these actions is at least in part a potential indicator of
methodological precision and/or fundamentalism. In order to illustrate this argument and
re-affirm the understanding that there are differences which exist between various
qualitative methodologies, the authors highlight some of the methodological tenets and
resultant methodological actions of four common place qualitative approaches. With
apologies to Barney Glaser, the authors acknowledge that grounded theory is not a
qualitative method per se, but a general method. It is, however, very commonly used as a
qualitative method.
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Phenomenology
Phenomenology is concerned with experiences, lived-experiences and embodied
experiences. It is a rigorous, critical and systematic study of the “essences” of life
experience. In other words, it seeks to capture and describe the structure or “essence” of
the lived experience of a phenomenon in the search for the “unity meaning” (Cutcliffe &
Ramcharan, 2002). Van Manen (1997) declares that phenomenology seeks the
identification of the essence of the phenomenon and its accurate description through
everyday lived experience. According to Levering (2006), phenomenology is inextricably
linked to the subject. Subject position involves the production of a description (and in
some cases interpretation) of lived experiences and how meaning is created through
embodied perception (Starks & Trinidad, 2007). Sampling is purposeful (not random)
and seeks to gain access to informants who have experienced the phenomenon of interest.
A variety of data collection techniques can be employed and numerous sources can be
“mined” to obtain data (e.g., interviews, observations, artifacts, poetry). While dissimilar
approaches to phenomenology have different, nuanced approaches to data analysis, each
to a greater or lesser extent involve descriptions of the phenomenon. Determining the
experiential structures that make up that experience, and textual analysis and structural
analysis or some related clustering/condensing of the non-parsimonious data in some
representation are the ‘essence’ of the experience.
Grounded Theory
Grounded theory (GT) is a general method used commonly as a qualitative
method for generating or inducing theory for (psycho) social research (Glaser & Strauss,
1967; Glaser, 1998). GT’s basic and central theme is generating theory from data that is
systematically obtained from social research. Consequently, GT is an inductive process
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967). It is a method for inducing and developing theory that should
provide clear enough categories and hypotheses to explain and aid understanding of the
basic (psycho)social process being studied (Cutcliffe, 2008). Research questions in GT (if
present at all) are markedly different to research questions postulated at the start of a
deductive study; indeed, Glaser (1992) repeatedly purports that a “true” GT begins only
with a general wonderment. Data collection is via theoretical sampling (Glaser, 2001)
whereby choices about who/what/where data units are sampled are driven by the
emerging findings as data analysis is undertaken. Accordingly, future data collection
cannot be arranged in advance of the emergence of the theory, conceptual categories and
their properties. Data analysis uses a process referred to as the constant comparison
method, whereby the four key process (compare incidents applicable to each category,
integrate categories and their properties, delimit the theory and write the theory) occur
simultaneously, in a cyclic, iterative, rather than linear, fashion (Glaser & Strauss, 1967;
Glaser, 1998). And the product of GT, not surprisingly, should be an explanatory theory
of how the participants in the study solve their key social/psychosocial problem,
described by Glaser as the key problem in the population/setting of interest. A well-
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constructed GT will meet its four most central criteria: fit, work, relevance, and
modifiability (Cutcliffe, 2008; Glaser, 2001).
Ethnography
Traditional (or classic) ethnography has its roots in cultural anthropology and
sociology (Boyle, 1994) and is concerned with describing and interpreting culture, subculture or a specific social group (O’Byrne, 2007). Ethnographies attempt to account for
human behaviours from the emic perspective; that is, from the perspective of those who
are on the inside, those who participate in the behaviour. As a result, irrespective of the
particular school of or approach to ethnography adopted by the researcher, they each will
incorporate the study of people’s lives over a prolonged time period through observation
(direct and/or participatory), interviews, field notes and mute evidence collection
(Cresswell, 1998). Sampling is purposeful, as the researcher deliberately and
purposefully selects the cultural unit to be explored and hopefully understood, and within
that cultural unit further purposeful sampling of participants belonging to (or part of that
culture) takes place. While various schools of or approaches to ethnography may make
use of different, nuanced approaches to data analysis, each to a greater or lesser extent
involve creating a thick description; that is, a depiction of the shared meaning within the
cultural norms or the patterned behaviour that is indicative of the culture and the cultural
context (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2005). Indeed, O’Byrne (2007) asserts that in order
for a study to be characterized and classified as ethnographic it must contain a large
proportion of four specific criteria, namely,
a) The study is undertaken to explore social phenomenon; b); the collected
data may be coded before collection is complete; c) the number of case
studies is small… and; d) qualitative analysis is used to interpret the
meaning and functions of human practices. (p. 1382)
Discourse Analysis
Discourse analysis is concerned with language and the use of language. More
specifically, discourse analysis attempts to understand how individuals achieve various
goals (personal, inter-personal, social and political) through the use of language (Gee,
2005; Johnstone, 2002). According to Johnstone (2002) what differentiates discourse
analysis from other forms of research is not the questions discourse analysts ask, but in
the ways they try to answer them:
By analyzing discourses, that is by examining aspects of the structure and
function of language in use. (p. 4)
For some scholars of discourse analysis, words and language are in and of themselves
meaningless; the specific meaning of words and language is brought about by the
creation of shared, mutually agreed upon meanings. For Starks and Trinidad (2007),
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Language both mediates and constructs our understanding of reality. (p.
1374)
While some proponents of discourse analysis (see for example Cheek, 2000) advance the
position that this approach is more of an instrument of analysis rather than a research
method(ology) per se, these authors simultaneously point out that the researcher must
clearly articulate the understanding of the approach being used. Examination of the
various approaches to discourse analysis shows that while these emphasize different
aspects of language use, each of these still view language as social interaction and are
concerned with the social contexts in which discourse is embedded (Cheek, 2000).
Moreover, all approaches to discourse analysis focus on texts (as representations of
reality), though what constitutes a text is a matter of debate. Similarly, all such
approaches seek to unveil hidden politics within the dominant orthodox view, as well as
all other discourses by means of applying critical thought to the social situations depicted
in the text. Likewise, while most approaches to discourse analysis would eschew rigid
approaches to data analysis or sampling, all these are interpretative and involve the
deconstruction of the text, and it can be argued that sampling is purposeful in that the
researcher(s) inevitably deliberately seek out certain texts.
In these overviews, even while acknowledging their brevity, it can still clearly be
seen that each approach includes certain prescribed methods and actions. Whether these
actions refer to the types of research questions the method can (and inversely cannot)
answer, or how, where, with what/whom the study can be undertaken, what types of data
are collected and how these are obtained, the nature and size of the sample, or the
particular approach(es) to data analysis or even what form the specific product of the
study should look like (e.g., a theory, a thick description), these actions identify the
approach (at least in part) as that particular method and simultaneously differentiate it
from others. Having illustrated some of the methodological tenets and resultant actions of
these qualitative approaches, the next logical questions that should be asked are:
1. Can a method be characterized or described as a phenomenology,
grounded theory, ethnography, or discourse analysis if it does not include
evidence of these methodological tenets and actions?
2. At what point does movement away from these tenets and actions mean
that one is no longer using one of these methods? When does one’s
method actually cease to be the method that drives the study?
It may help to think about this issue by considering the spectrum of light and transition
from one color to another. The blue-green spectrum (or palette) can be described as
having the end points of blue and green and a mid-point of cyan (Bruno & Svoronos,
2005). Strictly speaking, there are no clear demarcations between one color and another;
however, categories of wavelength and frequency have been used as approximations to
designate individual colors. To travel along the spectrum from blue to green, one first
encounters navy blue. This has moved the color ever-so-slightly away from blue and
towards green. Continuing the journey, one encounters dark blue, then medium blue,
deep sky blue, medium turquoise and then the mid-point, cyan. At this point in the
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spectrum, it is not clear whether the color in question is blue or green as it is
approximately halfway between blue and green. Continuing the movement along the
spectrum further away from blue and towards green, one encounters colors such as light
sea green, dark cyan, sea green and eventually arrives at green.
Analogously, a similar ‘journey’ along a continuum from one method to another
can help illustrate the insidious nature of methodological conflation and the authors draw
on the previously discussed “slurring” of grounded theory and phenomenology (Baker et
al., 1992). Beginning with GT, if the researcher moves slightly away from GT by
changing one of its methods/actions to one associated with phenomenology (e.g.,
attempts to use GT to study lived experiences and not psychosocial processes), then the
method, while still mostly a GT, is now also partly a phenomenological study. With each
successive replacement of a GT methodological action with a phenomenological
methodological action, the researcher moves further away from GT and closer to a
Phenomenological study. At some point (perhaps just past the mid-point?) the study
purporting to be a GT study can no longer legitimately call itself a GT as its
methodological actions define it, or identify it, more accurately as phenomenology.
Research Methodology and Method: Isomorphic Concepts, Close Affiliates or
“Distant Cousins?”
Examination of the extant literature emanating from nursing and psychology
shows that in some cases there appear to be some confusion and perhaps
misunderstanding as to the nature of research method and methodology (see also Carter
& Little, 2004). While these concepts are clearly closely related and linked, it is
inaccurate to posit them as one and the same (as many papers published in the above
mentioned literature do, perhaps inadvertently?). Not only is it necessary in terms of
conceptual clarity to understand how these are not isomorphic phenomena but also to
understand the differences simultaneously allows us to see how they are related. We can
see which comes first (so to speak), and what happens when there is incongruity between
study methodology and study method.
Several authors have put forward definitions of methodology (Bogdan & Biklen,
1998; Carter & Little, 2004; Crotty, 1998; Greene, 2007; Harding, 1987; Schram, 2003;
Schwandt, 2001; 2004). Methodologies have been described as discourses that are
comprised of epistemological views, edicts and assumptions through which scientists
construct approaches (or methods) for understanding the world (see for example
Schwandt, 2001). Some refer to methodology as the study of method. Crotty’s (1998)
definition purports that methodology is,
The strategy, plan of action, process or design lying behind the choice and
use of particular methods. (p. 3)
While acknowledging the vintage of the work, Kaplan’s (1964) definition, for the
authors, captures the key differences between methodology and method, stating that
methodology is
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The description, the explanation and the justification of the methods – not
the methods themselves. (p. 158, emphasis added)
Whereas (research) method has been described as the actual action or “doing” of
research, the actualization or operationalization of the methodology, is defined as
The procedures, tools and techniques of research (p. 158)
Accordingly, there is a broad consensus that research method is prefaced by research
methodology; that methodology comes first and is followed by method; and that
methodology justifies method (Carter & Little, 2007). This relationship between
methodology and method is captured succinctly and cogently by Guba and Lincoln
(1994), who state,
The methodological question cannot be reduced to a question of methods;
methods must be fitted to a pre-determined methodology
and they continue,
Questions of method are secondary to questions of paradigm, which we
define as the basic belief system or world view that guides the
investigators; not only in the choice of method but in ontologically and
epistemologically fundamental ways. (pp. 104-105)
With the hegemony of methodology clearly established (over method), what follows is
the requirement for the researcher to design a research method for his/her study that is
congruent with the underpinning methodology. The answers to the researcher’s research
methodological quandaries will be driven and contextualized by the underpinning
methodology. The particular research design challenges associated with the given method
will (should) be framed and viewed through the particular methodological “lens.”
To draw on some examples from the qualitative research approaches previously
outlined, the phenomenological researcher who wonders about what questions to ask in
an interview with a subject is guided, if not driven, by the phenomenological
methodological need to focus on and access the lived-experiences (Cutcliffe, Joyce, &
Cummins, 2004; van Manen, 1997; Levering, 2006). The Grounded Theorist who
wonders about the “correct” methodological procedure(s) for data collection and analysis
recognizes that the underpinning methodology requires him/her to undertake both
simultaneously. The Ethnographer who wonders about what the product of his/her study
needs to look like accepts that the ethnographic methodology requires the production of a
thick description. As well, the Discourse Analyst, when questioning the structure and
content of a certain text, understands that he/she needs to pay analytical attention to the
words that are missing just as much to as the words that are there.
If one accepts the robustness of this argument, then the view that the researcher
need not attempt to adhere to the methodological underpinnings of any given method is
further challenged and eroded. Moreover, for those researchers who, as Carter & Little
(2007) declare, have engaged in insufficient attention to matters of methodology and
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method and have clear incongruity evident between study methodology and method, it
can be argued that the product of such a study may not even qualify as legitimate
scientific knowledge. This requires further explanation. As we have established earlier in
this paper, scientific knowledge is inextricably linked to the practice of method, and that
method is prefaced and underpinned by methodology. Given that methods must be fitted
to a pre-determined methodology, if methodological slippage (Morse, 1991) has
occurred, and there is resultant incongruity between methodology and method, then the
study is not a scientific study and consequently cannot make the claim that it has
produced scientific knowledge.
Nevertheless, even the most ardent supporter of philosophical and methodological
purity will concede that methodologies are (a) Abstractions (or as Carter & Little, 2007,
assert – idealizations) rather than realities in the practical “real world” of research and,
(b) Methodologies and with that methods can and do evolve, develop and change over
time (see for example Glaser and Strauss’s acknowledgement that their pioneering 1967
book represented only the beginning of grounded theory and that it was entirely
appropriate for the methodology to evolve and develop over time.) Consequently, this
apparent tension needs to be acknowledged and considered. The authors are mindful of
Carter and Little’s (2007) statement that research methodologies themselves are
idealizations and they will always differ or be abstract from the researcher’s diverse
“logics-in-use”. To paraphrase, the explications and articulations of a research
methodology may be an idealized version of the actual application or utilization of the
methodology. Perhaps by way of an example, we can draw upon the key
phenomenological methodological tenet of seeking to understand the ‘moment-as-lived’
(van Manen, 1997; Levering, 2006; Kirova & Emme, 2009). Van Manen (1997; 2002;
2006) reminds us in his approach to phenomenology that the phenomenological
researcher deliberately eschews ex post facto reflection on or thinking about the momentas-lived, but seeks instead to access and understand the actual moment-as-lived (our
emphasis).
Kirova and Emme (2009) advance this argument, purporting that humans act and
experience before attaching language to their actions or experiences. As such, these are
pre-reflexive (our emphasis) experiences that are of particular interest to
phenomenological researchers. However, it has to be acknowledged that these are
idealized methodological tenets given that once the person has experienced his/her livedmoment, it has already passed and thus moved into the realm of past and strictly speaking
is no longer a pre-reflexive moment. In engaging in this approach to phenomenology
then, one obtains the closest possible approximation to the actual moment-as-lived by
getting participants to talk about moments as they lived through them – rather than what
they now think about those moments as they look back and reflect on them (Cutcliffe et
al., 2004; van Manen, 1997, 2002, 2006). But this remains then somewhat abstracted
from the methodological idea of accessing moments-as-lived.
Allowing for the fact that there is likely (if not inevitably) going to be some
difference between the original methodology and the actual method used in a
contemporary research study, this brings the debate back to the key issue: At what point
does deviation away from the methodology (an idealized abstraction and one subject to
evolution over time) and resultant method mean that the researcher is no longer faithful
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(or pure) enough to central tenets of the methodology to mean that the research is no
longer legitimate science?
The Deleterious Effects of ad hoc, Unthinking and Inattentive Methodological
Pluralism: Standing on the Precipice of Illegitimate Science?
Several authors have previously wrestled intellectually with some of the issues
focused on in this paper (see for example Greene, 2007; Carter & Little, 2007; Annells,
2006; Greckhamer & Koro-Ljunberg, 2005). To somewhat simplify the terms, we will
say that on the one hand is the stance advocated by so-called methodological (and
philosophical) purists or fundamentalists, and on the other hand is the stance advocated
by qualitative researchers whose actions suggest they have little to no difficulty with the
evolution and development of and/or deviation away from the tenets of a given
methodology. Which leads Carter and Little (2007) to point out that this produces a
Methodological label to a study design which is at odds with even the
most relaxed interpretation of that tradition. (p. 1319)
The authors of this current paper need to highlight a particularly important point here. It
should be noted in papers that advocate, shall we say, a more relaxed approach to
following the tenets of a given methodology (such as Johnson et al., 2002), they do not
advance such arguments on the basis of constructionist or relativist assumptions which
celebrate imprecision, deconstruct validity/credibility and oppose clarity. As we have
pointed out earlier in this paper, such authors advance the argument that methodological
precision does not increase the validity of the research findings. The argue against the
need for methodological precision and/or rigor in qualitative research by stating that,
the arguments for pluralism in qualitative research are to us
overwhelming. They are epistemological, pragmatic and political. There
are no ‘pure’ qualitative methods. (Johnson et al., 2002, p. 248)
The authors of this current paper would propose the existence of a third position or
stance. They contend that, if some of the qualitative research reports that can be found in
the extant literature are anything to go by, that there appear to be some qualitative
researchers who arguably do not fully understand their reported method; they appear to
have paid insufficient attention to matters of epistemology and methodology. In the sense
that these “deviations” or “developments” away from their stated method’s traditional
methodological underpinnings are not some deliberate attempt to advance the method;
neither do they represent some stance against methodological precision/fundamentalism.
They are simply misapplications, misunderstandings, and we would argue, not good
examples of qualitative research and ipso facto – not good science.
The authors stand with others who have drawn attention to the potentially
deleterious effects of ad hoc: unthinking, inattentive methodological pluralism and
conflation. In answering their own rhetorical question about whether or not the methods
or analytical steps of methods can be transfered between different research approaches,
Greckhamer and Koro-Ljunberg (2005) argue that such actions,
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May
result
in
conceptual
(methodological)
confusion…and
misunderstandings proliferate regarding the core concepts, actions and
practice associated with a given method. (p. 741)
While subject to development and evolution, methodologies that drive research methods
are themselves subject to context, (original) philosophical positions and epistemological
stances. Even allowing for some degree or extent of development and evolution, the
looseness of application of the method’s analytical techniques is not unlimited; it is still
bound by epistemology. Changing the “lens” through which the researcher views the
world, de-contextualizing the method from its original conceptualization, and detaching
the method from the methodology are likely to lead to abuses and
misinterpretations/misapplications of a method (Greckhamer & Koro-Ljunberg, 2005).
Lincoln and Guba (2000) are among the many research methodologists who are
adamant about the importance of philosophical purity because a researcher’s choices in
research design are framed directly and indirectly by his/her ontological positions. In
other words, method(ology) and philosophical views (ontology) are inextricably linked.
We can no more divorce the underpinning philosophy from method than we can detach
method from research per se. As a result any purported methodological development or
design choice has to be considered in the context of the method’s underpinning
philosophy(s). Guba and Lincoln (1994) accentuate this point when they state,
Differences in paradigm assumptions cannot be dismissed as mere
‘philosophical differences’; implicitly or explicitly, these positions have
important consequences for the practical conduct of inquiry, as well as for
the interpretation of findings and policy choices. (p. 113)
Accordingly, the position of Johnson et al. (2002), who purport that mixing, combining,
triangulating or otherwise using various qualitative methods concurrently is, “from both
philosophical and pragmatic viewpoints such an approach is not only sensible, it is
increasingly inevitable” (p. 243) is a mistaken proposition, and what is more, a pathway
to producing poor quality research.
The authors need to be very clear about this point. There is legitimacy to Johnson
et al.’s (2002) position that so-called purity of method is uncommon. As stated
previously, deviation away from the abstract, idealization of a given methodology into
the “real world” application of the method is, it seems, inevitable. Such deviations (some
would say adaptations and/or developments) do not automatically lead to (ill-thought out)
conflation or blending of qualitative methods. It is essential to note that variation in or
movement away from a method’s underpinning methodology and epistemological stances
can and does occur in well-designed studies; but such movement occurs purposefully
and/or has an robust rationale, grounded in the method’s original methodology (our
emphasis). As a result, any so-called methodological evolution, development or
conflation it is undertaken in order to add to the research design: to solve a problem. It
should not happen by mistake, by accident, through sloppiness or sloth, or as a result of
not understanding the nature of one’s methodology. Carter and Little (2007) offer
comparable remarks when they state,
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Methodologies can be combined or altered, providing that the researcher
retains a coherent epistemological position and can justify the choices
made, preferably in relation to both the theoretical context of the
methodology and the impact of the change on method and the final
research product. (p. 1326)
Not only is there a requirement for the researcher who wishes to conflate qualitative
methods to do so purposefully rather than accidently, but at the same time, such
methodological choices need to be described, justified and explained. As Greckhamer
and Koro-Ljunberg (2005) state very clearly,
It is vital for qualitative researchers to be aware of and lay open the
theoretical and epistemological foundations of their research to the
community of interested readers. (p. 732)
The ‘Slippery Slope’ or ‘Thin Edge of the Wedge’ Argument
Though cautious about engaging in catastrophic predictions, since such predictions
are seldom grounded in solid evidence, and serve to shut down rather than encourage
debate and “appeal” to a person’s fears rather than intellect, the authors do wish to add
their tentative voices to those of others who have speculated and warned of the dangers of
methodological slippage. Furthermore, we sincerely hope that these points, while
deliberately cursory, might serve as focal points for further discussion and we welcome
additional, much needed debate about these issues.
1)

Bad science – if the findings can legitimately be described as ‘science’ at all

In cases where qualitative researchers do not appear to fully understand their reported
method, pay insufficient attention to matters of epistemology and methodology and
unintentionally blend or conflate their methods, such research reports are not good
examples of qualitative research and not good science. Examples of ill-thought out
methodological conflation only fuel the detractors and skeptics of qualitative research.
Such papers only add weight to the argument that qualitative research isn’t “real science”
or a bona fide research paradigm.
2)

Lacking validity

A number of authors have highlighted how inconsistency or incongruence between
epistemology, theoretical stance and research method(s) only serves to obfuscate and
moreover, erodes the validity of the research undertaken (see Carter & Little, 2007;
Greckhamer & Koro-Ljunberg, 2005; Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Lincoln & Guba, 2000).
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Methodological confusion and lack of conceptual clarity
Erosion of a method makes it complicated to identify and define what is
(and isn’t) a method. (Greckhamer & Koro-Ljunberg, 2005, p. 738)

If the extant nursing and psychology literature is any indication, methodological slippage
results in methodological confusion and lack of conceptual clarity. The boundaries
between one research approach and another become blurred, important differences
between methodologies and methods are lost, and there is a homogenization of research
method per se. Further, while transfer of methods or analytical steps from one theoretical
stance/epistemology to another is possible it complicates the uses and applications of a
method.
4)
Imprecision begets further imprecision; it becomes the norm, the next
methodological orthodoxy
Qualitative research that pays insufficient attention to matters of epistemology and
methodology and unintentionally blends or conflates methods means a continuous cycle
of more bad examples. It means that methodologically imprecise research reports can
become the “norm”. As future students access these papers as examples of how to design
and undertake a qualitative study, this could result in a proliferation of research reports
that have all these identified major limitations.
5)

Findings lack credibility and lack utility/application

As Greckhamer & Koro-Ljunberg (2005) have pointed out, undertaking qualitative
research that pays insufficient attention to matters of epistemology and methodology and
unintentionally blends or conflates methods means that the theory of knowledge (of the
method) is now inconsistent with the theory of knowledge the researchers purportedly
produce. As a result, findings from such qualitative research lack utility and application.
They do not extend our knowledge base, cannot enhance practice, education or inform
policy; or indeed even highlight the next research questions.
Conclusion
Method, or more accurately methodological precision, goes to heart of the matter.
Studies that contain evidence of methodological slippage undermine the very nature of
the study; moving away from qualifying as legitimate science to being something else
(pseudo-science?).
Decisions about methodology matter because they will influence (and be
influenced by) the objectives, research questions, and study design and
provide the research strategy and thus have a profound effect on the
implementation of the research. (Carter & Little, 2007, p. 1326)
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While we accept that methodologies are abstract idealisations of “logics in use”, and are
themselves subject to development and evolution, the authors argue that they remain
subject to context, (original) philosophical positions and epistemological stances.
Consequently, the looseness of application of the method’s analytical techniques is not
unlimited; it is still bound by epistemology.
Qualitative researchers must stay true to their methodological ontologies and
epistemologies unless they can present their reasons for altering direction clearly and
concisely in a way that is replicable by other researchers. Contrary to what some may
believe--that discovery in qualitative research happens by happenstance--it in fact
happens through the application of the scientific method employing qualitative research
methods following a rigorous qualitative research methodology.
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